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Abstract
This paper uses an optimal auction approach to investigate the conditions under which
uniform pricing in IPOs is optimal. We show that the optimality of a uniform price in
IPOs depends crucially on whether the (optimal) allocation rule is restricted. These
restrictions may stem from the retail investors budget constraint and/or from the in-
stitutional investors preferences. We show that the main determinant of the optimality
of a uniform pricing rule is the existence and the shape of the retail investors budget
constraint. In contrast, institutional investors preferences are shown to mainly a¤ect the
optimal allocation rule.
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1 Introduction
The literature on Initial Public O¤erings (IPOs) has grown remarkably over the past few
decades. Most of this literature, both theoretical (e.g. Rock, 1986, Allen and Faulhaber,
1989, and Benveniste and Spindt, 1989) and empirical (e.g. Beatty and Ritter, 1986, Ritter
1987, and Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001), has focused on explaining a number of apparent mar-
ket anomalies surrounding IPOs such as underpricing, long-term underperformance, and hot
issues markets.1 Much less attention has been devoted to understand whether the current IPO
format, which imposes uniform pricing, is actually e¢cient. Firms that go public are currently
forbidden from using price discrimination; they can however quantity discriminate by choosing
an allocation rule and potentially rationing some investors. Virtually all papers in the IPO lit-
erature, to be consistent with current practice, simply assume uniform pricing. The only paper
addressing this issue (Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990) challenges the e¢ciency of the current
regulatory constraints, and suggests that rms could improve on their IPO performance (raise
the IPO proceeds) if they were allowed to price discriminate across investors.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the conditions under which uniform pricing is
optimal, where optimality is dened from the point of view of an issuer who wants to maximize
the sales expected proceeds. Our results show that the optimality of uniform pricing depends
on whether the (optimal) allocation rule is subject to certain restrictions. If this is the case,
then discriminatory pricing may be required to elicit information from the informed investor.
Otherwise (i.e. if the issuer has enough control over the allocation rule), quantity discrimination
alone su¢ces to achieve optimality. We consider two types of restrictions on the allocation
rule. The rst are direct and exogenous allocation constraints. The second type of restrictions
endogenously result from assuming non-linear preferences of institutional investors. Our results
indicate that only allocation constraints critically matter for the optimality of uniform pricing.
We also show that the optimality of uniform pricing depends on the existence of an allocation
constraint as well as on the shape of this constraint, since this will dene the extent to which
1Ritter and Welch (2002) provide a concise and useful review of the IPO literature. For a fully comprehensive
review of the theory and evidence on IPO activity see Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001).
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the allocation rule is restricted. On the other hand, institutional investors preferences only
a¤ect the optimal allocation rule. Specically, we show that with risk-neutral preferences,
the optimal allocation rule gives priority to retail investors, with institutional investors being
residual claimants. The opposite holds when preferences are non-linear.
In our IPO a rm wants to place a xed number of unseasoned shares. There are two
potential groups of investors: n institutional investors and a continuum of retail investors. Each
institutional investor receives a private signal about the value of the asset for sale, whereas both
the issuer and the retail investors are uninformed. The seller designs the IPO mechanism in
order to elicit private information from institutional investors and maximize the expected IPO
proceeds. We apply an optimal auction approach to derive the optimal IPO, which consists
in identifying the optimal allocation and pricing rule. We solve two di¤erent models. In the
rst, institutional investors are assumed to be risk neutral. This is in line with most of the
IPO literature. In the second, institutional investors are assumed to have preferences that are
concave in quantity but may place a higher valuation on the shares than do retail investors.
The non-linear preferences case represents the main novelty of the paper. Each of these models
is then solved under three di¤erent assumptions on the allocation constraint: (i) no allocation
constraint; (ii) a quantity constraint, i.e. a maximum (minimum) amount of share is to be
allocated to retail (institutional) investors; and (iii) a cash constraint, i.e. retail investors only
have a maximum amount of cash that they can spend in the IPO.2
We show that the optimal IPO cannot be implemented with a uniform pricing rule under
the second assumption (i.e. when retail investors are quantity constrained). In the other
cases, we show that uniform pricing is optimal in equilibrium. Additionally, our results imply
that underpricing always occurs when discriminatory pricing is needed to achieve optimality.
Conversely, this need not be the case when uniform pricing is optimal. The explanation behind
these results is that quantity constraints impose tighter restrictions on the sellers ability to
use quantity discrimination as a tool to elicit information from institutional investors, which
2We do not report the results for the case of non-linear preferences and cash constraints since due to com-
plexity of the technical problem, we cannot produce a closed form solution.
renders the complementary use of price discrimination necessary to achieve optimality. Another
contribution of the paper is the full characterization of the optimal allocation rule in all of
the di¤erent environments considered, with interesting implications for the use of rationing in
equilibrium.
The only other paper in the IPO literature that has dealt with the issue of optimal pricing
is Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990). However, our paper di¤ers from theirs in many respects,
the most important of which is the methodology used. We apply optimal auction theory, which
enables us to characterize the optimal IPO mechanism in a very general environment with
respect to both the informational structure and investors characteristics. The paper is also
closely related to Maksimovic and Pichler (2006), hereafter MP. Although the focus of their
paper is not on optimal pricing rule, they show that the existence and the size of underpricing
depends on the existence of allocation constraints. In this paper, we show that allocation
constraints also a¤ect the optimal pricing rule and we are able to say something about the link
between pricing rules and underpricing. Finally, we extend their model on three dimensions i)
we consider a continuous state space while MP is a discrete model; ii) we assume non-linear
preferences of institutional investors, which implies that, in our model, allocation constraints
may e¤ectively arise endogenously whereas in MP they are exogenously imposed and informed
investors are risk neutral; and iii) we also look at cash constraints, while they only consider
quantity constraints.
Our work yields a number of empirical predictions.
 The most direct implication is that uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing will lead
to the same IPO proceeds if the constraints on the allocation rule are not too tight. As
discriminatory pricing is forbidden in most countries, a direct test of this prediction is only
possible in the small number of countries where discriminatory pricing has been used in
IPOs. For example, Jagannathan and Sherman (2006) document the use of discriminatory
IPO auctions in Taiwan and Japan.
 We should observe greater underpricing in IPOs when there are tighter restrictions on
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the allocation rule, e.g. the requirement that a minimum quantity of shares be allocated
to institutional investors.3 This is consistent with the results of MP.
 Quantity constraints would result in larger underpricing than cash constraints. This
raises the issue of understanding which of these two types of constraints is more relevant
in practice, which is another interesting empirical research question.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we set up the model and derive the
sellers maximization problem for generic institutional investor preferences with no constraints
on the retail investors. The following sections then solve the model under di¤erent assumptions
regarding institutional investors preferences and allocation constraints. Section 3 analyzes the
case of linear preferences with and without an allocation constraint. In Section 4 the same
analysis is conducted in the case of non linear preferences. Finally, Section 5 investigates the
impact of cash constraints on retail investors with linear preferences of institutional investors.
The last section concludes with a discussion of the results. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
A rm would like to sell Q shares in an IPO, with Q xed and, without loss of generality,
normalized to 1. An intermediary is in charge of marketing the new shares. He is assumed
to act in the rms best interest. Hereafter, we will simply refer to the seller to denote the
rm-intermediary coalition. This is a standard way of modelling the role of an intermediary in
the IPO literature. The seller wishes to maximize the proceeds from the sale. He faces both
n(> 2) large institutional investors who hold private information about the rms market value,
and a fringe of retail investors, who are uninformed.
Institutional investors have private information in that each agent i receives a signal si
about the market value of the new shares. Signals are i.i.d. according to a uniform distribution
3This practice is supported by theoretical arguments (Stoughton and Zechner, 1998) in that the issuer wants
to have a minimum institutional ownership because institutional investors tend to monitor the rm more closely.
The empirical relevance is more di¢cult to prove, although it has been, for instance, observed in some OpenIPOs
run by WR Hambrecht. (We thank the referee for providing us with this useful piece of information).
5
dened on 
i = [s; s] with s > 0; so the cumulative distribution function is Fi(si) =
si   s
s
; with
s = s s, and the density function fi(si) =
1
s
: Let us also denote by f(s) the joint density
function so that f(s) = f(s1; :::; sn) =
Q
i
fi(si); with s = (s1; :::; sn) 2 
 =
N
i

i = [s; s]
n.4
Each signal received by an institutional investor represents a piece of information about the
market value of the new shares. We therefore assume that the value of the new shares, v; is a
function of the vector of signals received by institutional investors. More precisely, we assume
that v() is a function dened over 
 and is given by the average of all the signals, that is
v(s) =
1
n
X
i
si: (1)
The above function has two main properties: a) @v(s)
@si
> 0; i.e. the asset value is increasing in
each signal, and b) @v(s)
@si
= @v(s)
@sj
for any i 6= j; i.e. signals are equally weighted in the valuation
function. This kind of informational structure is very common in auction theory (e.g. Bulow
and Klemperer, 1996 and 2002) and is a straightforward generalization of the simple binomial
informational structure adopted in other IPO papers (e.g. Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990; Biais
and Faugeron-Crouzet, 2002) to a continuous signal space.5 It can furthermore be proved that
our results hold for any generic valuation function v(s) = 	(s) which satises properties a) and
b) above (i.e. @	(s)
@si
> 0 and @	(s)
@si
= @	(s)
@sj
for any i 6= j). For the sake of tractability, we prefer
a simple specication.
Given a vector of signals s; each institutional investor is preferences are given by the
following utility function:
ui(pi; qi; v(s)) = z(qi; v(s))  qipi for all i 2 f1; 2; ::::ng; (2)
where qi is the quantity assigned to investor i and pi is the price per share he has to pay.
We denote by Ti = piqi the total payment from investor i to the seller. The utility function
4Note that the uniform distribution of private signals satises the increasing hazard rate assumption. Indeed,
we have that for the uniform distribution
@
@si

fi(si)
1  Fi(si)

=
@
@si

1
(s  si)

 0 for all i and all si: We show
later in the paper that several of our results (in particular those in Section 3) do not change qualitatively if we
consider a more general distribution of signals satisfying the increasing hazard rate assumption.
5These papers assume that the signals investors receive can be either good or bad and the stock market value
is monotonic in the number of good signals. We make the same assumption, but we use a continuum of signals.
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in Equation (2) is linear in the transfer Ti: We make the following assumptions about the
institutional investors valuation function z (the subscripts denote derivatives with respect to
variables):
A1 z1 > 0 and z2 > 0;
A2 z11  0;
A3 z(0; v) = 0 for all v;
A4 z12 > 0 (single-crossing condition);
A5 z122  0 and z112  0;
A6 z12(0; v)  1:
6
We assume a continuum of competitive, uninformed, and risk-neutral retail bidders. The
total mass of these retail bidders is normalized to one. In the following sections, we will consider
the possibility that these investors face an allocation constraint, with the constraint taking a
number of di¤erent forms. Neither retail investors nor the seller hold any private information
about the market value of the asset and only observe the density f() of signals.
In order to extract the information from the institutional investors, the seller designs a
mechanism specifying the allocation and pricing rules for both institutional and retail investors.
By using the revelation principle, we can focus on direct mechanisms in which the seller asks
each institutional investor to announce his signal and then xes quantities and prices as function
of their announcements in such a way as to induce them to reveal their information truthfully
(see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
A mechanism is described by a pair of outcome functions (p; q) of the form p : 
 ! Rn+1
and q : 
 ! [0; 1]n+1 where p = (p1; :::; pn; pR) is a vector of prices and q = (q1; :::; qn; qR) is
a vector of allocations. Thus if s is the vector of signals announced by institutional investors,
each investor i 2 f1; :::; ng receives qi(s) shares and pays a price per share of pi(s), while retail
6Most of these assumptions are standard in the mechanism design literature. See Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991) for a discussion.
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investors receive qR(s) and pay a price per share of pR(s). We assume that all of the shares
issued must be allocated to either institutional or retail investors. The sellers choice of the
vector fqigi=1;::n implicitly determines the number of shares allocated to retail investors, qR,
which is given by:
qR = 1 
X
i
qi: (3)
The set of possible strategies for the institutional investor i with signal si is 
i: Faced with
a mechanism (p; q); his expected utility if he misrepresents his signal by announcing bsi to the
seller rather than his true signal si is
Ui(bsi; si) = Es ifui(pi(bsi; s i); qi(bsi; s i); v(si; s i))g
=
Z

 i
[z(qi(bsi; s i); v(si; s i))  qi(bsi; s i)pi(bsi; s i)] f i(s i)ds i ; (4)
where s i is the vector of all of the other institutional investors signals, i.e. s i = (s1; ::; si 1; si+1; :::; sn) and
f i(s i) =
Y
j 6=i
fj(sj):
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The optimal IPO mechanism for the seller is the solution to the following optimization
program:
max
(p;q)
UF = Es
"X
i
Ti(s) + TR(s)
#
=
Z


 X
i
Ti(s) + TR(s)
!
f(s)ds ; (5)
subject to the following standard constraints:
 Retail Investors Participation Constraint (RPC). This requires the expected payo¤ for
retail investors to be greater than their reservation utility, which equals zero.
Es [qR(s)(v(s)  pR(s))] =
Z


qR(s) [v(s)  pR(s)] f(s)ds  0: (RPC)
Thus the constraint is conditional on the initial distribution of the signals which implies
that retail investors commit to buying the share without ever learning the reported signals.
This in turn implies that they do not play strategically in the IPO game.
7Note that the expected utility of agent i depends on the mechanism o¤ered by the seller (p; q); which is
omitted in our notation for the sake of simplicity.
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 Institutional Investors Participation Constraint (IPC). The IPC ensures that each in-
stitutional investor is willing to participate in the o¤ering conditional on his own signal.
The expected utility of each institutional investor, conditional on his signal, should be
greater than his expected utility when he does not participate in the IPO. The IPC is
then written as follows:
Ui(si; si) = Es i fz(qi(s); v(s))  qi(s)pi(s)g
=
Z

 i
[z(qi(s); v(s))  pi(s)qi(s)] f i(s i)ds i  0: (IPC)
This must be satised for all i and all si:
 Institutional Investors Incentive Compatibility Constraint (IIC). This constraint ensures
that each institutional investor has no incentive to misrepresent his type - the signal he
receives - to the rm. The IIC then requires that each agent i be better o¤ by truthfully
announcing his signal. Using Equation (4) this may be written as follows:
Ui(bsi; si)  Ui(si; si) for all si; bsi and i; (IIC)
or, equivalently,
si 2 argmax
bsi
Ui(bsi; si) for all si; bsi and i: (IICa)
 Full Allocation Constraint (FAC).
X
i
qi(s) + qR(s) = 1 for all s ; (FAC)
and the quantity non-negativity constraints:
qi(s)  0 for all i and s: (6)
Finally, we will also introduce the appropriate allocation constraint.
The above optimization program can be simplied by re-arranging the constraints. In the
Appendix, we show that the sellers optimization program can be written as follows
9
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
max
fqign1
R



v(s) +
P
i

z(qi(s); v(s)) 
1
n
(s  si)z2(qi(s); v(s))  v(s)qi(s)

f(s)ds
s:t :
(i) Ui(s; s) = 0 for all i
(ii) 1
n
Es i

z12(qi(s); v(s))
@qi(s)
@si

 0 for all i and all si
(iii) qi(s)  0 for all i and all s
(iv)
P
i
qi(s)  1 for all s:
(P)
Note that this program depends only on quantities. Once optimal quantities have been deter-
mined, optimal prices can be obtained from the participation constraints of both the institu-
tional and the retail investors. For all si and all i; prices for institutional investors satisfyZ

 i
pi(s)qi(s)f i(s i)ds i =
Z

 i
z(qi(s); v(s))f i(s i)ds i  Z

 i

1
n
Z si
s
z2(qi(esi; s i); v(s))desi f i(s i)ds i: (7)
Likewise, for retail investors, the optimal pricing rule must satisfy the (binding) participation
constraint Z


pR(s)qR(s)f(s)ds =
Z


v(s)qR(s)f(s)ds: (8)
Equations (7) and (8) above will typically admit multiple solutions. We are interested in
verifying whether there exists at least one equilibrium requiring a uniform price for all investors,
i.e. a price function p(s) such that p(s) = pi(s) = pR(s) for all i and all s:
It is worth noticing that the sellers program in this setup is quite di¤erent from that in
a standard auction design problem where an uninformed seller faces usually only informed
bidders. The participation of a class of uninformed bidders in the auction makes the problem
rather di¤erent and interesting in the sense that it mitigates the adverse-selection problem
vis-à-vis the informed investors and, thus, lowers the sellers cost of extracting their private
information.8 What really matters, however, is not that retail investors are uninformed but
8In a very similar framework, Malakhov (2006) investigates the impact of retail investors participation on
the issuers revenues. It is shown that the sellers revenues are increasing in the number of uninformed investors
participating in the o¤ering, since more uninformed investors lowers the outside option of informed investors
and, consequently, as in our model, reduces the cost of gathering information.
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rather that their information, if any, di¤ers from that of the institutional investors and, more
importantly, that they do not play strategically, i.e. it is impossible to elicit their information.
This point has previously been made by Maksimovic and Pichler (2006).
3 Risk-neutral institutional investors
We start by analyzing the standard case in the IPO literature of risk-neutral institutional
investors. We thus assume that the informed investors valuation function is
z(q; v(s)) = v(s)q ; (9)
and the utility function of investor i is
ui(pi; qi; v(s)) = [v(s)  pi] qi: (10)
We also assume that the allocation rule is restricted. We model this restriction as a quantity
constraint on retail investors, i.e. there exists a maximum quantity of shares K < 1 they can
buy. In other words,
qR(s)  K: (11)
Notice that, in our model where the number of shares issued is xed, this constraint is
equivalent to requiring that a minimum quantity of shares be allocated to institutional investors.
In other words we could just as well write it as
X
i
qi(s)  1   K; which represents a quite
common, though implicit, practice in IPOs. There may be several reasons why this is the case:
due to the monitoring role played by institutional shareholders which potentially enhances the
rm value (Mello and Parsons, 1998, Stoughton and Zechner, 1998), or because of the tight links
with the underwriter who tends in turn to favor his institutional clientele over retail demand
in IPOs (Aggarwal, 2003; Aggarwal et al., 2002).
In this case the sellers problem is the following:
11
max
fqign1
Z



v(s) 
P
i

1
n
(s  si)qi(s)

f(s)ds
s:t :
(i) Ui(s; s) = 0 for all i
(ii) Es i

@qi(s)
@si

 0 for all i and all si
(iii) qi(s)  0 for all i and all s
(iv)
P
i
qi(s)  1 for all s
(v) qR(s)  K for all s:
(P1 )
In the next proposition we characterize the optimal IPO mechanism in terms of allocation and
pricing rules:
PROPOSITION 1 If institutional investors are risk neutral and retail investors can buy at
most K shares, the optimal IPO is characterized as follows:
1. (Allocation rule) For all s 2 
; let sm = maxfs1; :::; sng: In equilibrium, the issuer
allocates as many shares as possible to retail investors and the remaining shares to the
institutional investor reporting sm, that is qR(s) = K and qm(s) = 1 K.
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2. (Pricing rule) The optimal IPO requires discriminatory pricing such that pm(s) <
pR(s) = v(s):
In the Appendix, the above Proposition is proved for a generic distribution of private signals
satisfying the increasing hazard rate assumption.
To understand the logic behind the above result notice that the sellers objective function
is decreasing in the term
Z


P
i

1
n
(s  si)qi(s)

which represents the institutional investors
information rents and can be easily shown to be increasing in the quantity qi(s) and in the signal
si. These properties together ensure that the seller optimally allocates as much as possible to
retail investors, i.e. up to their quantity constraint, with any residual quantity going to the
9Note that as a result of the continuous distributions we consider in our model, the probability of having
more than one agent announcing sm is zero.
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institutional investor with the highest reported signal who then receives a strictly positive
information rent.10 To see why he also pays a lower price than do retail investors, simply note
that with linear preferences, after replacing the optimal quantity, the ICC becomes
[v(s)  pm(s)](prob si > s i)qm(s)  [v(s)  pi(bsi; s i)](prob bsi > s i)qm(s)
given that qm(s) > 0 and v(s) = pR(s); it must be that pR(s) > pm(s):
In the absence of an allocation constraint, the result below follows directly from Proposition
1:
COROLLARY 1 When institutional investors are risk neutral and retail investors are not
constrained, the optimal o¤ering is such that all the shares are sold to retail investors irrespective
of the signals reported by the informed investors, at a marginal price of pR = v(s).
This result is a generalization of MP to a continuous state space and implies that risk-
neutral institutional investors receive no information rents because, in equilibrium, they are
actually excluded from the o¤ering. These results can be shown to hold for all distributions
satisfying the increasing hazard rate condition.
With respect to this sections results, it is important to note that retail investors have pri-
ority in the allocation. This highlights the important role that uninformed investors play in the
IPO process. Their presence mitigates the adverse-selection problem vis-a-vis the institutional
investors, and consequently allows the seller to lower the cost of eliciting their private infor-
mation by exploiting the competition between the two groups of investors. If retail investors
have unlimited buying capacity, then the cost of information gathering is zero (Corollary 1).11
This in turn implies that the existence of an allocation constraint is in fact detrimental to the
e¢ciency of the selling mechanism.
In reality, however, we never observe an IPO in which all of the shares are placed with
retail investors. In the light of this empirical regularity, our results then suggest that: a) the
10It should be clear that the assumption of an increasing hazard rate is crucial for this result because it
ensures that information rents increase in signals. Di¤erent assumptions regarding the behaviour of the hazard
rate would of course a¤ect the optimal allocation rule.
11The role of retail investors has been already stressed by Benveniste et al. (1996), Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet
(2002), Maksimovic and Pichler (2006) and Bennouri and Falconieri (2006).
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most relevant empirical situation is that of maximum (minimum) quantity constraints on retail
(institutional) investors; or b) institutional investors preferences may not be linear. In the
next section, we look at the impact of assuming that institutional investors have non-linear
preferences on our results.
4 Non-Linear Preferences
The previous section suggests that the optimality of uniform pricing essentially depends on
whether the seller can freely use the allocation rule to discriminate among investors. It is
then natural to ask whether introducing risk aversion or some kind of concavity in institutional
investors preferences may also a¤ect optimal pricing, to the extent that this reduces the sellers
discretion in allocating shares. We therefore relax the risk-neutrality assumption in this section,
and introduce concavity in the institutional investors valuation function, which becomes:12
z(qi; v(s)) = qi(v(s) 

2
qi): (12)
When   1; this new valuation function z(; ) is concave in quantity, satises Assumptions
A1-A6, and produces a marginal valuation which is decreasing at an exogenously given rate,  >
0:13 We consider this specication of the utility function because concavity indirectly restricts
the discretion of the seller to allocate the shares and, as such, it may a¤ect the optimality of
uniform pricing. Further, concavity in quantity may be interpreted as aversion to inventory
risk, i.e. the risk associated with portfolio composition.14 We also assume  > 1; which means
that institutional investors value the shares more than do retail investors for small quantities,
but with a decreasing marginal valuation. That is, at qi = 0; their marginal valuation is v
whereas the marginal valuation of retail investors is v: In other words, institutional investors
are very keen to participate in the IPO and obtain a positive quantity of shares, but their
marginal utility decreases as the allocation increases, possibly due to inventory risk. If there
12Risk neutrality is the most common assumption in the IPO literature. Other papers that have, like us,
assumed non-linear preferences are Stoughton and Zechner (1998) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1997).
13Notice that the new valuation function does not describe standard risk-averse preferences, which are typically
concave in wealth.
14This is well documented for instance in the market-microstructure or foreign-exchange market literatures
(see for instance OHara, 1995, and Lyons, 2003).
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is no cash constraint on retail investors, the optimal allocation rule with  = 1 is the same as
that under risk neutrality, i.e. the seller allocates the entire quantity to retail investors. In this
case, institutional investors preferences do not matter.
We rst analyze, in the next section, the optimal mechanism in the absence of constraints on
retail investors in order to isolate the impact of institutional investors non-linear preferences.
We subsequently add the allocation constraint.
4.1 NO CONSTRAINTS ON RETAIL INVESTORS
The sellers optimization program in this case can be written as:
max
fqign1
Z



v(s) +
P
i

qi(s)

(  1) v(s) 

2
qi(s) 

n
(s  si)

f(s)ds
s:t :
(i) U i(s; s) = 0
(ii) Es i

@qi(s)
@si

 0 for all i and all s
(iii) qi(s)  0 for all i and all s
(iv)
P
i
qi(s)  1 for all s:
(P2 )
Thus, (P2) is identical to (P1) except for the di¤erent utility function and the absence of
condition (v).
The next proposition describes the optimal selling mechanism.
PROPOSITION 2 Assume that institutional investors have non-linear preferences described
by Equation (12) and that there is no allocation constraint. The optimal IPO is characterized
by the following allocation and pricing rules:
1. (Allocation Rule) For all i and all s; let eqi() be such that
eqi(s) =
(
(  1)nv(s)   (s  si)
n
for all si  s

i
0 otherwise
where si =
s ( 1)v i
2 1
; with v i =
P
j 6=i
sj then
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 If
X
i
eqi  1; only the institutional investors reporting a signal above si receive a positive
quantity equal to eqi(s). Retail investors receive the remaining shares;
 If instead
X
i
eqi > 1 (oversubscription); the institutional investors reporting a signal above
si receive a positive quantity bqi(s) = eqi(s) Q, where Q is the amount of shares by which
they are rationed.15 Retail investors obtain no shares.
2. (Pricing Rule) The optimal IPO mechanism can be implemented by a uniform pricing
rule with p  v(s). If
X
i
eqi  1; then p = v(s): IfX
i
eqi > 1; then p > v(s):
Contrary to the case of risk neutrality, the institutional investors now have priority in
the allocation rule. The result stems not from the non-linear preferences of the institutional
investors, but rather from assuming that their marginal valuation of the asset at qi = 0 is larger
than the marginal valuation of the retail investors. Notice that the threshold si is decreasing
in the parameter  which implies that as the institutional investors marginal valuation of
the asset at qi = 0 increases, a larger fraction of them receive a positive number of shares.
Furthermore, the optimal quantity eqi(s) is decreasing in  and increasing in the signal si reported
by the institutional investor. In other words, the seller rewards better information about the
stock value (i.e. higher signals) with a larger quantity of shares. In conclusion, the results of
Proposition 2 crucially depend on the assumption of  > 1: Indeed, as previously noted, with
 = 1; non-linear preferences would lead to the same results as in the case of risk neutrality.
The pricing rule is due to the fact that in this model where there is no allocation constraint,
all the shares can always be sold to retail investors at a price p = v(s); so that the optimal
price need not be set below this minimum value.
The next section analyzes the case of non-linear preferences with the addition of an allocation
constraint similar to the one considered in Section 3.
15Specically, as we show in the Proof in the Appendix, Q =(s)

where  (s) is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier
associated to the constraint (iv) of (P2 ).
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4.2 QUANTITY CONSTRAINTS
We now introduce a quantity constraint as dened in Equation (11). The sellers optimization
problem then becomes
max
fqign1
Z



v(s) +
P
i

qi(s)

(  1) v(s) 

2
qi(s) 

n
(s  si)

f(s)ds
s:t :
(i) U i(s; s) = 0
(ii) Es i

@qi(s)
@si

 0 for all i and all s
(iii) qi(s)  0 for all i and all s
(iv)
P
i
qi(s)  1 for all s
(v)
P
i
qi(s)  1 K for all s:
(P3 )
Problem (P3) is the same as (P2) with the addition of constraint (v). The optimal
mechanism is then described by the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 3 When institutional investors have non-linear preferences and retail in-
vestors are quantity constrained, the optimal IPO is characterized by the following allocation
and pricing rules:
1. (Allocation Rule) there exists a threshold value of the signals si =
s ( 1)v i
2 1
; with
v i =
P
j 6=i
sj; such that,
 If 1   K 
P
i
eqi(s)  1; all the institutional investors reporting a signal above
the threshold si obtain a positive quantity eqi(s) = (  1)nv(s)   (s  si)n . The
remaining shares are allocated to retail investors.
 If
P
i
eqi(s) < 1   K; then retail investors receive K shares; the remaining 1   K
shares are allocated to all the institutional investors reporting a signal si > s
K
i with
sKi < s

i :
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 If
P
i
eqi(s) > 1 (oversubscription), the institutional investors with signals above the
threshold si obtain a quantity bqi < eqi (rationing). The retail investors receive no
shares..
2. (Pricing Rule) The optimal pricing rule is such that
 If the allocation constraint is not binding, the optimal IPO can be implemented by
uniform pricing;
 Conversely, if the constraint is binding, then a discriminatory pricing rule is optimal,
such that: pi(v) = pI < v(s) for all i and pR = v(s):
The allocation rule result is quite intuitive. When there is a restriction on the allocation
rule, the seller may be forced to allocate to the institutional investors more shares than would
otherwise be optimal. Specically, in order to place all the shares, the issuer will have to
allocate a positive amount of shares to some institutional investors reporting a signal below the
threshold si .
As for the pricing rule, in the presence of an allocation constraint, whether the optimal price
is discriminatory or uniform depends on whether the constraint is binding or not in equilibrium,
which in turn depends on the value of the parameters  and : For su¢ciently high values of
 and/or low values of  the allocation constraint will not be binding, and thus, we are back
to the case of no constraints where a uniform price is optimal. An alternative reading of this
result is that if parameter K were to be determined endogenously, it would be optimally set
so that the constraint never binds.
5 Cash-constrained retail investors
The results of the previous sections suggest that the form of the optimal pricing scheme depends
on whether there is a binding allocation constraint, which is in turn a¤ected by the specic
characteristic of the institutional investors preferences. We can also think about di¤erent types
of constraints. Hence, in this section, we analyze the case of cash-constrained retail investors
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that can a¤ord/are willing to invest at most K in the sale, in the context of linear preferences
of institutional investors.
The new optimization program for the seller is similar to program (P1 ), except that the
last constraint, (v), is replaced by the cash constraint for retail investors.
max
fqign1
Z



v(s) 
P
i

1
n
(s  si)qi(s)

f(s)ds
s:t :
(i) Ui(s; s) = 0 for all i
(ii) Es i

@qi(s)
@si

 0 for all i and all si
(iii) qi(s)  0 for all i and all s
(iv)
P
i
qi(s)  1 for all s
(v)

1 
P
i
qi(s)

pR(si; s i)  K for all s:
(P4 )
We are aware that with a continuum of retail investors, it is less plausible to justify the
existence of such a constraint at the aggregate level, even though the constraint holds individu-
ally. However, the purpose of our analysis is to investigate whether di¤erent kinds of allocation
constraints a¤ect di¤erently the optimal pricing rule. In other words, we want to understand
whether it is just the existence of such a constraint that matters or also its shape (the functional
form). We expect this to be the case, as di¤erent forms of allocation constraints will determine
the tightness of the allocation rule. For instance, contrary to the maximum quantity constraint
previously considered, the above cash constraint depends on both the number of shares pur-
chased and their price, thereby providing, by construction, more exibility to the issuer when
it comes to IPO design, as he can rely on both price and quantity to achieve optimality.
The optimal mechanism is described in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 4 With risk neutral institutional investors and cash constrained retail in-
vestors, the optimal IPO is characterized as follows:
1. (Allocation rule) The issuer satises retail investors up to their cash constraint. The
remaining shares are allocated to the institutional investor reporting the highest signal
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sm = maxfs1; s2; ::::; sng.
2. (Pricing rule) There exists at least one uniform price that implements the optimal IPO.
The above results imply that, as with linear preferences, retail investors have priority in the
allocation of shares. In this case, though, the allocation rule depends on the price. We thus
need to solve for the optimal pricing rule and then step back to obtain explicitly the equilibrium
quantities. This suggests that the issuer has enough leeway to choose an allocation rule that
can be supported by an optimal uniform price.
More generally, the cash constraint restricts less the allocation rule than the quantity con-
straint. The exibility gained by the issuer is enough to allow uniform pricing at the optimum.
Again, we do not obtain a unique optimal price. We nd that there may be more than one
optimal uniform price, and that equilibria may exist with discriminatory pricing.
6 Discussion
This paper has investigated the conditions under which the uniform pricing rule in IPOs is opti-
mal. The issuer can potentially use both quantity and price discrimination to elicit information
from informed investors and achieve optimality (i.e. maximize the sale proceeds). Our ndings
show that as long as quantity discrimination is su¢ciently unrestricted, the issuer does not also
need price discrimination, so that the optimal IPO can be implemented with uniform pricing.
The allocation rule may be restricted because of direct allocation constraints and/or because
institutional investors have non-linear preferences. Allocation constraints in our model can be
of two types, cash or quantity constraints. We show that the most important determinant of
the optimal pricing rule is the existence of an allocation constraint and its shape. Conversely,
institutional investors preferences are shown to have a direct impact on the optimal alloca-
tion rule. Specically, when non-linear preferences are considered, in equilibrium, contrary to
the case of risk neutrality, institutional investors have priority in share allocation over retail
investors who become residual claimants. Furthermore, the institutional investors preferences
also indirectly a¤ect the optimal pricing rule to the extent that the specic values of parameters
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 and  determine whether or not the allocation constraint is binding in equilibrium.
The model delivers a number of empirical implications:
 The most direct implication is that uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing will lead
to the same IPO proceeds if the allocation rule is unrestricted. Seeing as discriminatory
pricing is forbidden in most countries, a direct test of our results will only be possible in
the few countries that have allowed discriminatory pricing in IPOs. For example, both
Taiwan and Japan have used discriminatory IPO auctions (i.e. pay-your-bid auctions,
see Jagannathan and Sherman, 2006), that could allow a test of our results. However,
there are still no examples of discriminatory pricing in bookbuilding.
 A second empirical implication predicts that we should observe greater underpricing in
IPOs characterized by quantity constraints rather than cash constraints. This raises the
issue of understanding which of these two types of constraints is more relevant in practice,
which is another interesting empirical research question.16
 Related to the previous point, our results predict that underpricing should be more im-
portant in IPOs where the existence of a quantity constraint is associated with a low
demand for the shares by the institutional investors.
Appendix
The sellers optimization program (P). From the RPC and the maximand we can see
that the sellers prot is increasing in the retail investors payments, therefore at the optimum
the RPC binds. We can then rewrite the RPC as follows:Z


pR(s)qR(s)f(s)ds =
Z


v(s)qR(s)f(s)ds =
Z


v(s)
 
1 
X
i
qi(s)
!
f(s)ds ; (13)
where we have replaced qR(s) from the FAC. We now turn to the IIC. By applying the envelope
theorem to the maximization problem in Equation (IICa) and then taking expectations over
16Derrien (2005) is, to our knowledge, the only paper to document that in some French IPOs a fraction of
the shares on sale is explicitly reserved to retail investors.
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si, we have:
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Ui(si; si) = Ui(s; s) +
Z si
s

1
n
Z

 i
z2(qi(esi; s i); v(s))f i(s i)ds i desi: (14)
Since the sellers payo¤ is decreasing in the information rents paid to the informed investors, at
the optimum he will set Ui(s; s) = 0; so that the informed investors with the lowest evaluations
receive zero rents at the optimum. Inverting integrals, taking the expectation over si and
applying Fubinis theorem18 to Equation (14) yieldsZ

i
Ui(si; si)fi(si)dsi =
1
n
Z

 i
Z

i
Z si
s
z2(qi(esi; s i); v(s))desi fi(si)dsi f i(s i)ds i: (15)
Integration by parts of the integral of the term in brackets on the l.h.s. yields the followingZ

i
Ui(si; si)fi(si)dsi =
1
n
Z


(s  si)z2(qi(s); v(s))f(s)ds: (16)
Finally, from the denition of the expected utility of institutional investors, we have for all i
and all si Z

 i
pi(s)qi(s)f i(s i)ds i =
Z

 i
z(qi(s); v(s))f i(s i)ds i   Ui(si; si)  0: (17)
Taking expectations over si and using Equations (16) and (13) we obtain the sellers objective
function as stated in the optimization program (P). Constraint (ii) in (P) is a monotonicity
condition which is a su¢cient condition for truth-telling to be optimal.19 For prices paid by
institutional investors, plugging Equation (14) into Equation (17) yields Equation (7). Prices
for retail investors satisfy their (binding) participation constraint.
Proof of Proposition 1. For generality, we prove the result using a generic distribution
f () satisfying the increasing hazard rate assumption. Writing Equation (16) with the general
distribution function gives the following objective function for the seller
max
fqign1
Z


(
v(s) 
X
i

1
n

1  Fi(si)
fi(si)

qi(s)
)
f(s)ds: (18)
17Notice that the equation below holds at the optimum, i.e. for bsi = si:
18Fubinis theorem states that we can invert integrals whenever the integrand is nite.
19The monotonicity condition is derived by using Assumptions 4 and 5. In the mechanism design literature,
it is often referred to as an implementability condition.
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This objective function is decreasing in the quantity allocated to institutional investors (qi(s)).
The cost of allocating a positive quantity to them, measured byZ


(X
i

1
n

1  Fi(si)
fi(si)

qi(s)
)
f(s)ds; (19)
is decreasing in the signal si because of the increasing hazard rate assumption. Consequently,
the allocation rule maximizing the sellers revenues consists in allocating as much as possible to
retail investors (i.e. up to their budget constraint) and any residual quantity to the institutional
investor(s) having (and reporting) the highest announced signal (i.e. the agent with the signal
sm = maxfs1; s2; ::::; sng). Since signals are continuously distributed only one agent announces
sm. Denote by qm(s) the quantity allocated to this agent.
With risk neutral investors, the pricing conditions (7) and (8) becomeZ

 i
pi(s)qi(s)f i(s i)ds i =
Z

 i

v(s)qi(s) 
1
n
Z si
s
qi(esi; s i)desi f i(s i)ds i
for all si and all i (20)
and Z


pR(s)f(s)ds =
Z


v(s)f(s)ds: (21)
We prove the result by contradiction. Assume the existence of a uniform price function, such
that p(s) = pm(s) = pR(s) for all s; that implements the optimal mechanism. Applying this to
Equation (20), taking expectations over si and summing over n givesZ


p(s)
"X
i
qi(s)
#
f(s)ds =
Z


(
v(s)
"X
i
qi(s)
#
 
(X
i
1
n
Z si
s
qi(esi; s i)desi
))
f(s)ds:
(22)
Since
P
i qi(s) = 1   K and
R


p(s)f(s)ds =
R


v(s)f(s)ds, a necessary condition for the
existence of a uniform price isZ


(X
i
1
n
Z si
s
qi(esi; s i)desi
)
f(s)ds = 0:
However, qi(s) is always non-negative and strictly positive for one investor. So this last equation
never holds which contradicts the initial assumption about the existence of an optimal uniform
price function.
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Proof of Proposition 2. For the rst part of this proposition, we consider the relaxed
problem (i.e. we drop the monotonicity constraint in program (P2 )) and check it ex post. As
such, the objective function becomes an ordinary maximand with the constraints dened at
each point and can be maximized pointwise on 
: The number of shares, qi(s); the seller must
assign to investor i in order to elicit his information is given by the following maximization
problem, for each s 2 
,
max
fqigi=1;::n
P
i

qi(s)

(  1) v(s) 

2
qi(s) 

n
(s  si)

s:t :
Ui(s; s) = 0 for all i
qi(s)  0 and
P
i
qi(s)  1 for all i and s:
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem are8>>>>><>>>>>:
(  1)v(s)  qi  

n
(s  si) + i(s)  (s) = 0; for all i
i(s)qi(s) = 0
(s)[1 
P
i
qi(s)] = 0:
(23)
With i and  being the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated to the feasibility constraint and
the FAC, respectively. Now denote the sellers objective function by H(q; v(s)), that is
H(q; v(s)) =
X
i

qi(s)

(  1) v(s) 

2
qi(s) 

n
(s  si)

; (24)
with qi 2 [0; 1] and s 2 
 = [s; s]
n: This function is concave in qi for all i; since
@2H
@q2i
 0. Now
let si(v i) =
s ( 1)v i
(2 1)
for all i and v i and dene the following sets for all s 2 
;
N (s) = fi 2 N j si  s

i(v i)g ;
N+(s) = fi 2 N j si > s

i(v i)g:
We can easily show that for each i 2 N (s) it must hold that qi(s) = 0: Then, for each
i 2 N+(s); dene the quantity eqi by
(  1)v(s)  eqi(s)  
n
(s  si) = 0: (25)
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For each i 2 N+(s), eqi(s) is positive: If, P
i2N+(s)
eqi(s)  1 , then the quantity eqi(s) is the solution
of our mechanism.20 If however,
P
i2N+(s)
eqi(s) > 1 , which corresponds to oversubscription of
the new shares, then the quantity eqi(s) cannot be optimal as it violates the FAC. The optimal
quantities, which we denote by bqi(s); are given by the solution to the following system of
equations, 8>>><>>>:
bqi(s)[(  1)v(s)  bqi(s)  
n
(s  si)  (s)] = 0X
i2N+(s)
bqi(s) = 1; (s) > 0; (26)
which implies that bqi(s) is either zero or is positive and solves the following equation
(  1)v(s)  bqi(s)  
n
(s  si)  (s) = 0: (27)
Clearly, in this case, all the shares are allocated to institutional investors. Retail investors
receive nothing in equilibrium.
To prove the existence of an optimal uniform price function, we proceed in three steps. In
the rst step (Step 1), we derive a condition for the existence of a uniform pricing rule for
institutional investors, i.e. pi(s) = pI (s) for all i and s. Subsequently (Step 2), we show the
existence of a unique uniform pricing rule; last, in Step 3, we show that the same pricing rule
can be applied to retail investors, i.e. pI(s) = pR(s).
Step 1: The linear transfer for institutional investors must satisfy Equation (7). Consider
the following price function
p0i (s) =
z(qi(s); v(s)) 
1
n
hR si
s
z2(qi(esi; s i); v(esi; s i))desii
qi(s)
; (28)
for each si and each qi(s) such that qi(s) 6= 0:
21 Any price satisfying Equation (7) can also be
written as pi(s) = p
0
i (s) + i(s), where i satises the following equationZ

 i
i(s)qi(si; s i)f i(s i)ds i = 0; for all i and si: (29)
20In this case, the equation dening eqi(s) is the FOC of our objective function H, since the Kuhn-Tucker
multipliers, i(s) and (s) are both zero.
21Otherwise p0i (s) = 0:
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The existence of a uniform price function for institutional investors implies that the marginal
e¤ects of changes in the private signal of di¤erent investors on prices are equal, that is @p(s)
@si
=
@p(s)
@sj
for all i and j:22 Applying this uniformity condition to an admissible pricing function gives
@p0i (s)
@si
+
@i(s)
@si
=
@p0i (s)
@sj
+
@i(s)
@sj
: (30)
Multiplying both sides by qi(s), writing
@p0i (s)
@si
and
@p0i (s)
@sj
; and considering from Proposition 2
the fact that @qi(s)
@si
  @qi(s)
@sj
= 
n
for each s and each i; allows us to write Equation (30) as follows
@
@si
2664i(s)  n
Z si
s
qi(esi; s i)desi
qi(s)
3775 = @@sj
2664i(s)  n
Z si
s
qi(esi; s i)desi
qi(s)
3775+ 2n; (31)
for each i and each j: This is a partial di¤erential equation in i(s) 

n
Z si
s
qi(esi; s i)desi
qi(s)
whose
generic solution is given by
i(s) = '(s1 + :::+ sn) +

n
R si
s
qi(esi; s i)desi
qi(s)
+

2n
si; for all i (32)
where '() is a twice-di¤erentiable function dened on the set [ns; ns] = n
: So, we have shown
that the optimal mechanism may be implemented by a uniform price schedule if and only if
p(s) = pi(s) = p
0
i (s) + '(s1 + :::+ sn) +

n
Z si
s
qi(esi; s i)desi
qi(s)
+

2n
si ; (33)
for all i; where ' is a twice di¤erentiable function satisfying the following integral equationZ

 i
'(s1 + :::+ sn)qi(si; s i)f i(s i)ds i =
 
Z

 i
2664n
Z si
s
qi(esi; s i)desi
qi(s)
+

2n
si
3775 qi(si; s i)f i(s i)ds i = g(si):
(34)
22This is true in our model where all signals are equally informative. In this case, the uniform price, if it
exists, must be equally sensitive to a change of the private signal of any investor. In other words, what matters
is by how much the signal has changed and not whose signal it was.
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Proving the existence of a uniform price schedule is equivalent to proving the existence of this
function '.
STEP 2: We rst show that Equation (34) can be written as a Volterra integral equation
of the rst kind.23 Then, by simply applying the general properties of this kind of integral
equation we can prove the existence and the uniqueness of the function '. To do so, we rst
need to transform Equation (34) into a simple integral equation, i.e. with the support dened
on R. Notice that, since qi(si; s i) = 0 when si  s
0
i (v i); the support of the integral Equation
(34) is equal to 
0 i = f(s1; s2; ::; si 1; si+1; ::; sn) j
P
j 6=i sj = v i > v
0
 i(si)g where v
0
 i(si) is
dened as the inverse of s0i (v i); i.e.
v0 i(si) =
s  (2  1)si
  1
: (35)
Also, from the denition of the optimal quantity, the l.h.s. of Equation (34) equals
R

0
 i
'(si+
v i)qi(si; v i)f i(s i)ds i: By applying the Generalized Change Variable Theorem (GVCT) we
can set v i = i(s i) for each i; which nally implies that i(

0
 i) = [v
0
 i(si); (n   1)s] 2 R:
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One key implication of the GVCT is that there exists a measure  dened over [v0 i(si); (n 1)s]
such thatZ

0
 i
'(si + v i)qi(si; v i)f i(s i)ds i =
Z (n 1)s
v0
 i
(si)
'(si + v i)qi(si; v i)(dv i): (36)
Last, by applying the Radon-Nikodým theorem25, we are also able to prove the existence of a
density function  associated with the measure  such thatZ

0
 i
'(si + v i)qi(si; v i)f i(s i)ds i =
Z (n 1)s
v0
 i
(si)
'(si + v i)qi(si; v i)(v i)dv i: (37)
From the above result, the integral Equation (34) reduces toZ (n 1)s
v0
 i
(si)
'(si + v i)qi(si; v i)(v i)dv i = g(si): (38)
23A Volterra integral equation of the the rst kind is dened in the following way:Z (x)
y0
f(x; y)h(x; y)dy = g(x);
in other words, one of the integral limits must depend on the variable x:
24See Dunford and Schwartz (1988, 3rd Ed.), chapter 3, lemma 8, page 182.
25See, for example, Dunford and Schwartz (1988, 3rd Ed.), chapter 3, theorem 2, page 176.
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This is a Volterra integral equation of the rst kind which ensures that, as long as the function
g is well behaved, a solution in ' always exists. This shows the existence of a unique uniform
pricing rule for institutional investors. We denote such a pricing rule by pI(s) in the following.
Step 3: To complete the proof it remains to show that the uniform price for institutional
investors also applies to retail investors. This is equivalent to showing that pI(s) satises the
retail investors participation constraint. This problem is relevant only in the cases for which
both retail and institutional investors receive positive amounts of shares at the optimum. We
start by dening the following sets:
 
  = fs j qi = 0 for all ig; i.e. all the quantity is distributed to retail investors;
 
n
  = fs j qi(s) 6= 0 for at least one ig:
Recall that the retail investors participation constraint can be written as followsZ


pR(s)qR(s)f(s)ds =
Z


v(s)
 
1 
X
i
qi(s)
!
f(s)ds: (39)
Proving that uniform pricing applies to all investors is then equivalent to demonstrating the
existence of a price function pR(s) solving the above integral equation and such that:
pR(s) =
(
p (s) for all s 2 
 
pI(s) for all s 2 
n

 :
(40)
which requires that retail investors are charged di¤erent prices depending on whether they
receive the whole quantity or not. The problem then boils down to proving the existence of a
price p (s) such thatZ

 
p (s)f(s)ds =
Z


v(s)
 
1 
X
i
qi(s)
!
f(s)ds 
Z

n
 
pI(s)
 
1 
X
i
qi(s)
!
f(s)ds: (41)
We then prove the following:
LEMMA 1 A price function p (s) as dened in Equation (41) exists if and only if it satises
the following equationZ

 
p (s)f(s)ds =
Z


fv(s) +H(q; v(s))gf(s)ds 
Z

n
 
pI(s)f(s)ds ; (42)
where the function H(q; v(s)) denes the sellers payo¤ at the optimum.
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Proof of Lemma 1:
For the only if part, suppose there exists a price p (s) which satises the participation
constraint of retail investors. This implies that the sellers expected payo¤ at the optimum is
given by Z

 
p (s)f(s)ds+
Z

n
 
pI(s)f(s)ds =
Z


fv(s) +H(q; v(s))gf(s)ds (43)
due to the uniform pricing rule and the fact that all of the shares are always sold.
For the If part, taking the expectation of Equation (7) over si and summing over i givesZ


X
i
pi(s)qi(s)f(s)ds =
Z


X
i

z(qi(s); v(s)) 
1
n
Z si
s
z2(qi(esi; s i); v(esi; s i))desi f(s)ds:
(44)
Using the fact that all institutional investors pay the same price and adding  
R


pI(s)f(s)ds
and
R


v(s) (1 
P
i qi(s)) f(s)ds to both sides yields the followingR


p(s) (1 
P
i qi(s)) f(s)ds 
R


v(s) (1 
P
i qi(s)) f(s)ds =R


p(s)f(s)ds 
R


fv(s) +H(q; v(s))gf(s)ds:
(45)
If the uniform price exists then the r.h.s. of the above equation is equal to zero which imme-
diately implies that the retail investors participation constraint, on the l.h.s. of the equation,
holds. This ends the proof of Lemma 1
The right-hand side of Equation (42) does not depend on the agents signals and so the
integral equation dened over p (s) has many solutions. This proves that the seller could nd
an optimal pricing function where a uniform price is applied to all investors. Note nally that
the seller may choose among di¤erent pricing rules that may be applied for retail investors
when s belongs to 
 . This ends the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3. In the proof of Proposition 2, we dened si(v i) =
s ( 1)v i
(2 1)
:
Dene the following sets for all s
N (s) = fi 2 N j si  s

i(v i)g
N+(s) = fi 2 N j si > s

i(v i)g

+(s) = fi 2 N j qi(s) > 0g
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and let $+ = Card(
+(s)): Note that 
+(s) will be dened endogenously. The solution of the
relaxed problem is very similar to that of Proposition 2. Pointwise maximization leads to the
following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(  1)v(s)  qi  

n
(s  si) + i(s)  (s) + (s) = 0; for all i
i(s)qi(s) = 0
(s)[1 
P
i
qi(s)] = 0
(s)[1 
P
i
qi(s) K] = 0
(46)
where i;  and  are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated to the three remaining constraints.
Note that  and  cannot be di¤erent from zero at the same time. If we consider that  = 0;
then we obtain the same problem as in the case without budget constraints which proves the
rst, second and fourth points in the allocation part of the proposition, and the rst point in the
pricing rule part. For the third point of the allocation rule, suppose that
P
i2N+(s)
eqi(s)  1 K.
In this case (s) = 0 and the seller will choose the allocation rule that minimizes the cost
associated to the allocation constraint, i.e., the parameter (s): In this case, retail investors
receive K shares and the optimal allocation rule for informed investors is that satisfying the
following condition:
(  1)v(s)  qi  

n
(s  si) + (s) = 0 (47)
for all i 2 
+(s), with (s) solving the equation below:
(s) =
(1 K)
$+
+

n
s 

n$+
X
j2
+(s)
sj   (  1)v(s) (48)
By replacing (s) in the previous FOC, we nally obtain that the optimal quantity for informed
investors is
eqKi (s) = 1$+
8<:(1 K) + n ($+   1)si   n X
j2
+(s); j 6=i
sj
9=; (49)
which must be positive. So the threshold sKi is the highest value for which eqKi (s) < 0. We omit
the proof of the optimal pricing function as it is the same as that of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. We omit the proof of the optimal allocation rule as it is the same
as for Proposition 1. For the pricing rule, note that the uniform price schedule must satisfy
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retail investors participation constraints and budget constraints. This yields the following
conditions Z


v(s) (1  q(s)) f(s)ds = K (50)
p(s) (1  q(s)) = K for all s
where p, the unitary price paid by the institutional agent, satises Equation (7). The sub-
stitution of p from the retail investors budget constraint in Equation (7) gives the following
conditionZ
[s;sm]n 1

K
(1  q(s))

q(s) +
1
n
Z sm
s
q(esm; s m)desm f m(s m)ds m = 0: (51)
Note that in Equation (51), integration is only considered for the values of s m for which q(s)
assigned to agent m is positive. Proving the existence of a uniform price function is then
equivalent to proving the existence of a function q(s) that is the solution to equations (51) and
(50). Finally denote by z(s m) a function such that:Z
[s;sm]n 1
z(s m)f m(s m)ds m = 0:
We can thus re-write Equation (51) as follows
K
(1  q(s))

q(s) +
1
n
Z sm
s
q(esm; s m)desm = z(s m): (52)
Denoting X(sm; s m) =
Z sm
s
q(esm; s m)desm;26 we can also write Equation (52) as follows
[K  
1
n
X(sm; s m) + z(s m)]X
0(sm; s m) +
1
n
X(sm; s m)  z(s m) = 0 (53)
where X 0(sm; s m)) =
@X(sm;s m)
@sm
= q(sm; s m):
We have so far shown that establishing the existence of a uniform price for all investors is
equivalent to proving the existence of a function X(sm; s m) that solves the non-linear rst-
order di¤erential equation presented in Equation (53) with Equation (50) as a nal condition.
26More precisely this is X(sm; s m) =
Z sm
sl
q(esm; s m)dsm where sl is the highest signal in s m: To keep
notation simple, we rewrite the integral as indicated, using the fact that q(esm; s m) = 0 for some values of esm
in the interval [s; sm]:
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This di¤erential equation has at least one solution for each chosen function z(): This gives
the seller enough leeway to construct the desired uniform price consistent with the optimal
mechanism.
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